Land use impacts of biofuel expansion have attracted a tremendous amount of attention because of the implications for the climate, the environment, and the food supply. To examine these impacts, we set up an economic framework that links input use and land allocation decisions with ethanol and agricultural commodity markets. Crops can be substitutes or complements in supply depending on the relative magnitude of three effects of crop prices: total cropland effect, land share effect, and input use effect. We show that with unregulated free markets, total cropland area increases with corn prices whether crops are substitutes or complements in supply. Similarly, higher corn yields from exogenous technical changes lead to cropland expansion. The impacts of yield increases for other crops are ambiguous. With a quantity mandate for ethanol, higher mandates mean larger cropland area if corn and other crops are substitutes in demand. For a given mandate, yield improvement causes total cropland to expand if crop demand is elastic enough, or to contract under a very general condition if crop demand is sufficiently inelastic.
Introduction
The urgency of assessing the impacts of biofuels on land use is underscored by two recent events.
First, the Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007 (EISA) directs the government to support the development of analytical tools for assessing greenhouse gas emissions of biofuels, i n c l u d i n g " e mi s s i o n s r e l a t e d t o d i r e c t a n d i n d i r e c t l a n d u s e c h a n g e s . " Second, recent research, notably two articles published in Science, has shown that instead of mitigating climate change, the use of biofuels may actually increase greenhouse gas emissions when land use impacts are taken into account (Searchinger et al. and Fargione et al.) . To what extent biofuels can reduce greenhouse gas emissions is vital to the future of the sector because EISA requires that carbon reduction thresholds be met before biofuels can be counted as contributing toward mandates.
Besides this federal government requirement, California and many other states have established low carbon standards for transportation fuels. The appropriate assessment of land use changes, which are often associated with large changes in carbon emissions, will be essential to the assessment of the greenhouse impacts of biofuels.
Despite the importance of the issue, it is not clear just how land use changes should be assessed. There is even skepticism about whether land use changes can be rigorously modeled.
Land use changes as a result of biofuel production are often divided into direct and indirect land use changes. Different definitions have been given to these seemingly straightforward concepts ( e . g . , Wa n g a n d Ha q , a n d O' Ha r e ) . I n g e n e r a l , i t a p p e a r s t h a t direct land use changes refer to changes directly associated with the production of feedstock for biofuels. Any other land-related changes are considered indirect land use changes. According to Dale, while direct land use c h a n g e i s a l e g i t i ma t e s u b j e c t , t h e " i n d i r e c t l a n d u s e c h a n g e c a u s e d b y b i o f u e l p r o d u c t i o n i s t e n u o u s , u n c e r t a i n a n d h i g h l y s p e c u l a t i v e . "
To date, most studies that examine the land use impacts of biofuels do not consider market reactions in response to biofuels production (e. g., Feng et al., Righelato and Spracklen, and Fargione et al.) . Feng et al. pointed out that carbon emissions on land before and during land conversion can be larger than the emissions avoided by biofuels. Similarly, Righelato and Spracklen, and Fargione et al. compared the carbon impacts of using land for biofuels versus using the same land directly as a carbon sink through trees, grasses, and/or soil. Both studies found that the latter outweighed the former in its impact. How biofuels production changes crop prices, how price changes induce the clearing of forests or other land, and how corn and other crops compete for cropland were not examined in these studies.
There are only a handful of studies thus far that take into account crop markets in estimating land use impacts of biofuels. In Searchinger et al., crop supply and demand were studied in the context of international commodity markets. They estimated new demand for cropland and then assigned it to different regions based on historical conversion patterns that might not be plausible in the context of biofuel expansion. Keeney and Hertel performed a comprehensive general equilibrium analysis on the land use impacts of biofuels. Real-world market forces were well represented by their simulation framework. However, it is often challenging for non-expert readers to see interactions among essential drivers because they are conta i n e d i n t h e " b l a c k b o x " o f t h e s i mu l a t i o n mo d e l s . Further, as acknowledged by Birur et al. in a related analysis, the usefulness of these models is limited by the availability and quality of data, and this can also be a source of criticism of analyses based on such models. Given the skepticism surrounding land use modeling, simple and transparent analyses can facilitate an understanding of fundamental issues.
In this paper, we develop a simple but rigorous analytical framework that embodies major essential economic forces affecting land use decisions: the allocation of land between crops, input use, crop markets and prices, land markets, and yield improvement. Our analysis is closely related to the large literature on land allocation and input use decisions that has no direct connection to biofuels (e.g., Arnade and Kelch, Orazem and Miranowski, Chavas and Holt) . In most of these papers, the acreage allocation decisions are considered for a given fixed total cropland area. In our paper, we link the acreage allocation decisions with responses in total cropland area. We show how changes in crop supply are determined by adjustments in input use, land share, and total cropland area.
Through the integrated framework of ethanol and land use decisions, we study the drivers behind land use changes in different policy contexts: (i) a laissez-faire environment without government intervention; (ii) government subsidies for ethanol production; and (iii) government mandates on ethanol quantity, which can act as either minimums or maximums that constrain the ethanol industry. Yields can have major impacts on land use changes. Higher yields have been touted as a key solution to the competition between food, fuel, and wilderness (Farrell, Monsanto, and Zulauf). However, if higher yields mean more profitable farming, yield increases could induce cropland expansion. Within our analytical framework, we are able to make some general predictions with regard to the land use impacts of higher biofuel prices or government incentive programs. The role of higher yields is shown to be different under different policy scenarios.
We begin our analysis by laying out the components of the modeling framework. We then analyze the responses of endogenous variables to price changes. Finally, we use these responses to examine acreage adjustments at market equilibrium under different scenarios.
Modeling framework

Land use and commodity supply
The supply of agricultural commodities depends on the allocation of land between crops, land quality, input use, and total cropland area. To reflect land heterogeneity, each parcel of land is associated with a land quality index,, indicating yield potential. The index is normalized to between zero and one, i.e., [0, 1] 

. Higher means lower quality: the best land has 0  while the worst land has 1  . Total land that could be planted to crops is normalized to one.
The probability distribution function of land is denoted as  u  . Then, the amount of land witĥ 
We also allow for the possibility that the yield of a crop may drop as a greater share of cropland is devoted to that crop. For example, in Iowa, corn is generally grown in rotation with soybeans. As a greater share of land is devoted to corn, it is likely that more corn will be planted after corn. The yield drag of continuous corn production is well documented (Hennessy) . Thus, we assume 0 i i y   . Note that we do not model rotation explicitly, even though 0 i i y   is used to capture some rotational effects.
The output of crop i on land of quality  is equal to yield multiplied by the area devoted to the crop. Let output and input prices be i p and w , respectively. Then we can write the net return from farming land of quality  as 3
1 To economize notation, note that we use i y to indicate both the yield function and the value of the yield function.
2 Superscripts indicate derivatives, e.g., For any given , net return is maximized through decisions on two variables: land allocation between crops and input use for each crop. That is, the following optimization problem is solved given input and output prices:
Assuming interior solutions, we can write the first-order conditions of (2) as 
wh e r e " * " i n d i c a t e s o p t i ma l s o l u t i o n s . We assume that the second-order conditions are satisfied.
The optimal land share and input use are functions of both commodity prices and land quality, and so the full notation for them is * ( ; ) The optimized net return is higher for better land because better land has a higher yield for any given land allocation and input use. Mathematically, this means
In the long run, additional land will be brought into agricultural production as long as net return from farming is positive. 4 Denote the quality range of land in production as * [0, ]  , implying that total cropland area is
Given (5), this means that in equilibrium, we have Thus, *  is a function of p ; i.e., in equilibrium the quality of the marginal land depends on crop prices. The decisions on land share and input use and the optimal total cropland area will determine the supply of crops. Summing over land of different quality, the total supply of crop i is (7) * ( ) * * * 0 ( ) ( ( ; ), ( ; ); ) ( ; ) ( )
Ethanol market
Progress in technology determines the rate of conversion from corn into ethanol. We use , For simplicity, we assume that ethanol is the only output and energy is the only input at ethanol plants, even though there are other outputs (e.g., distillers grains) and other inputs (e.g., enzymes and labor). Considering these factors will not change our main results but will make exposition more complicated.
Let e p and f p be the price of ethanol and its input, respectively. Ethanol producers choose the quantity of ethanol to maximize profit for given technology and prices, i.e.,
, , = ,
where  e is the profit from ethanol production; i Q is the quantity of commodity i for i representing ethanol, corn, and energy. We assume for most of our analysis that the ethanol price is exogenously given, i.e., not affected by the amount of ethanol produced. This will be a r e a s o n a b l e a s s u mp t i o n a s l o n g a s e t h a n o l ' s s h a r e a mo n g t r a n s p o r t a t i o n f u e l s i s v e r y s ma l l a n d s o its price is essentially determined by gasoline prices. Currently, ethanol accounts for less than 5% of gasoline consumption (on an energy equivalent basis) in the United States and so demand is quite elastic. Results developed under this assumption will also hold for some range of demand elasticity that is less than perfectly elastic. When ethanol production substantially increases, it is necessary to consider that the ethanol price is endogenously determined in conjunction with the markets for transportation fuels.
The long-run equilibrium condition for ethanol production is (9) , , 0, 0, 0
where eD c Q is the equilibrium demand for corn in ethanol production. The above condition requires that the marginal profit from ethanol equals zero if ethanol is produced at all. We can express the demand for corn from ethanol plants as follows:
, ,
Thus, the demand for corn from ethanol production is perfectly elastic for given ethanol and corn prices that satisfy the equality condition in (10). This equality condition indicates that in the long-run equilibrium, the corn price is given for a given ethanol price: c p is equal to the value of ethanol from one bushel of corn, subtracting any cost incurred in the conversion process.
Commodity markets
Besides ethanol, corn is also used for other purposes, primarily as a food source through livestock production. Denote corn demand for these non-ethanol uses as ( ) fD c Q p , which is a function of the prices of corn and other crop to account for substitutability between the crops.
Total demand for corn is the sum of demand from animal production and demand from ethanol plants. The left panel of Figure 1 presents an illustration of the corn market. The kink on the demand curve occurs at the breakeven corn price c p in ethanol production, which is also the equilibrium price. At this price, corn used for animal and ethanol production is 1 Q and 
For any given prices, p , the supply of commodities and the demand of commodities as food sources are given. However, for any corn price satisfying the equality condition in (10) There are essentially three variables in (11)-(12) that have to be determined:
If one of these variables is known, then we can solve for the other two.
System equilibrium and government policies
A system equilibrium is defined by a set of prices and quantities that satisfy the equilibrium conditions (3), (4), (6), (9), (11), and (12). We assume that the system has a unique stable equilibrium, meaning that after a temporary shock, interactions in the system will cause it to adjust and converge back to its initial equilibrium when the shock is removed. At system equilibrium, total production equals total use for ethanol and each crop; total cropland area equals the sum of production areas of corn and other crop; and net return from agricultural production equals zero for cropland of the lowest quality. In the absence of policy intervention, the corn price will be determined by the ethanol price through (9), and we then can solve for the system equilibrium as follows. First, plug c p into (12) (11) to derive the equilibrium quantity of corn for ethanol. The prices will also determine the equilibrium land share, input use, and total cropland area through (3), (4), and (6).
If the government provides a subsidy for every unit of ethanol produced, then the corn price is still exogenously determined, though it would be higher than without the subsidy. The system equilibrium in this case can be solved in a way similar to that described in the previous paragraph. Alternatively, suppose that the government sets a mandate that constrains ethanol production either as the maximum or minimum amount of ethanol allowed. An example is the ethanol mandates stipulated in EISA, which sets a series of (minimum) quantities of corn ethanol that have to be met in the coming years. If a mandate is not binding, then the system will reach an equilibrium as if there were no mandate. However, if a mandate is binding, then c p will not be determined by the equality condition in (10), which will no longer necessarily hold. For a fixed eD c Q , crop prices and land use variables are simultaneously determined by other equilibrium conditions.
Assessing land use impacts of a change in crop prices
As mentioned in the introduction, direct land use changes are generally defined as those directly associated with the production of corn used for ethanol while indirect land use changes are any other changes related to land use. Obviously, ethanol draws corn from both new and old corn p r o d u c t i o n f i e l d s , wi t h " o l d " me a n i n g the situation before ethanol expansion. Similarly, some corn produced on newly converted cropland is used as animal feed. In one extreme though unlikely case, corn produced on all new cornfields could be used as animal feed whereas ethanol could draw corn from existing production. Thus, we really have to track ethanol corn back to its production field in order to identify direct land use changes.
Alternatively, we can consider direct land use changes as newly added corn production area that can come from two sources: cropland originally devoted to other crop, and newly added cropland. These sources are represented by changes in * ( ; ) i   p and * ( )  p , respectively. Even viewed this way, the distinction between indirect and direct land use change is not clear. Part of the newly added cropland will often be used for the other crop and therefore will not be considered as a direct land use change. However, this change in land use is obviously determined by the same market forces as the part devoted to corn production. For these reasons, our analysis will just focus on overall land use changes without distinguishing between direct and indirect changes.
Impacts of a price change on land allocation and input decisions
From Section 2.4, we know that total cropland area, land share, input use, and commodity prices are all jointly determined. However, for the sake of exposition, we can think sequentially as follows. First, total cropland area, land share, and input use are determined through (3), (4), and (6) for any given commodity prices. Then, commodity prices are determined through (9), (11), and (12). In light of this logic, we first examine how land use is affected by commodity prices and then incorporate equilibrium price adjustments into the analysis. From (3) and (4), we can obtain the following (all proofs are given in the Appendix):
In plain words, given 0 as more production shifts from rotational corn to continuous corn production (see Figure 2 for an illustration). This is consistent with the agronomic observation that continuous corn production requires more input and has lower yields.
Similarly, we can derive the impact on total cropland area as follows:
That is, ceteris paribus, total cropland area increases with commodity prices. Note that total cropland area at the initial equilibrium equals 
Impacts of a price change on crop supply
Land allocation and input use adjustments in response to changes in crop prices will be translated into changes in crop supply. Differentiating (7) with respect to j p , we have for any ,
(total land effect) * * * * * * * * * 0 ( ; ) ( ( , ; ) ( , ; ) ( ; )) ( )
(input use effect).
The three effects, as defined in (13), are basically those examined in Remarks 1 and 2.
According to these remarks, land share effect and input use effect have the same sign, which is not necessarily the same as the sign of total land effect. For ease of reference, we define the following conditions. 
Condition A (Corn and other crop are substitutes in supply):
under Condition A;
The competition for land makes corn and other crop likely substitutes in supply, while the need for rotation makes them likely complements in supply. Whether corn and other crop are substitutes or complements in supply depends on which of these forces is stronger.
Land use impacts at market equilibrium
Our objective is to examine how land use responds to changes in ethanol production. In Remarks 1 and 2, the results on land share, input use, and total cropland area are derived with respect to a change in one crop price; the price of other crop is held constant. To assess land use impacts at market equilibrium, we need to take into account how changes in one crop will lead to changes in the price of other crops.
Land use impacts without government intervention
For a given corn price, (12) determines the price of other crop. Totally differentiating (12) with respect to prices and rearranging, we obtain d dp p dp p p dp
Change in total cropland area is the sum of the two effects of higher corn prices: the direct effect and the indirect effect that acts through changes in the price of other crop. Remark 2 shows that
. Thus, the sign of * ( ) c d dp  p depends on the indirect effect through o p .
Proposition 2. When the corn price is set equal to the breakeven price in ethanol production, if
corn and other crop are substitutes in demand, then total cropland area increases with the corn price at market equilibrium regardless of corn and other crop being substitutes or complements in supply.
Intuitively, an increase in c p enhances the profitability of cropland making it profitable to bring poorer quality land into agricultural production. If corn and other crop are substitutes in both supply and demand, then higher c p means less supply and more demand for other crop resulting a higher price for other crop. Total cropland expands as farming becomes more profitable with higher prices for all crops. If corn and other crop are complements in supply, then more land devoted to corn requires more land devoted to other crop as well. Thus, higher c p results in more land for both corn and other crop, indicating increased total cropland area. Note that such cropland expansion can cause the price of other crop to fall.
Land use impacts of ethanol subsidies
Price subsidies for ethanol are equivalent to increases in the ethanol price for ethanol producers.
From (9), it is clear that such subsidies will increase the breakeven corn price in ethanol production. Thus, we can assess the land use impacts of subsidies by looking at the impacts of higher corn prices, which are examined in the preceding subsection.
Land use impacts of ethanol mandates
Let e c Q  be the quantity mandate for ethanol expressed in terms of the quantity of corn required.
Given such a mandate, the corn price is no longer determined by the long-term breakeven price in ethanol production. Instead, it will be jointly determined by (11) and (12) The response in total cropland area depends on how crop prices respond to higher demand for corn arising from a higher ethanol mandate. A higher demand for corn will lead to a higher corn price. Whether corn and other crop are substitutes or complements in supply, total cropland area increases, as shown in Proposition 2.
Land use impacts of higher yields without government intervention
We are particularly interested in how yield improvement affects the equilibrium land use. Before turning to this question, we n e e d b e c l e a r a s t o t h e e x a c t me a n i n g o f " yield improvement" g i v e n that yield is a function of input use, land share, and land quality. Yield improvement enhances the profitability of corn, increasing net returns to land for any given land allocation. Thus, land of poorer quality will be drawn into production with a higher corn yield. Yield improvement for other crop would have the same effects except for one difference. Corn prices are determined by ethanol prices and so are not affected by changes in corn supply. By contrast, an increased supply of other crop can reduce its price in equilibrium, relieving the pressure for cropland expansion. The overall impacts of yield increases for other crop depend on how responsive its price is to changes in its supply due to higher yields. If its price does not drop too much, then total cropland area will increase.
Land use impacts of higher yields under ethanol mandates
The impacts of higher yields under an ethanol mandate are similar to those in crop supply and demand models without the mandate. The only difference is that instead of maintaining a zero difference between corn supply and demand, here we need to guarantee that the difference is a positive constant. How supply responds to higher yields and how demand and crop prices adjust will be exactly the same as in crop models without ethanol mandates.
Proposition 5. Under a given mandate, higher yields for either corn or other crop will result in (i) more total cropland area if crop demand is perfectly elastic, and (ii) less total cropland area if crop demand is perfectly inelastic and land share and input use move in the same direction.
Remark 1 indicates that, ceteris paribus, land share and input use move in the same direction for a change in the price of any crop. The condition at the end of the above proposition requires that, when all crop prices are allowed to adjust, they will still move in the same direction. With continuity, we can conclude the following: Intuitively, productivity increases will increase crop supply if nothing else changes. For any given amount of corn that has to be set aside to meet the requirement of an ethanol mandate, this will put downward pressure on crop prices. How much crop prices change is crucial to determining total cropland area. With a binding mandate that caps ethanol production, all the increased corn supply will be devoted to food production. Given that food demand is inelastic, ethanol policy that has created a floor mandate. With a floor, total demand for corn is likely quite elastic, implying that total cropland is likely to expand.
Concluding remarks
In this paper, we have developed a straightforward economic framework to assess the land use impacts of biofuels. We analyzed land use changes of ethanol expansion given adjustments in acreage allocation between crops, the quality and availability of additional land for crop production, agricultural crop markets, and ethanol production. When agricultural crops are converted to transportation fuels, a direct link is created between crop markets and crude oil markets. Without government intervention, this means that higher crude oil prices will result in higher corn prices. Until recently, at relatively low crude oil prices, the biofuel industry has largely depended on the government for development or even survival. If crude oil prices persistently stand at over $120 a barrel, then the biofuel industry can expand without government support. Such expansion will lead to more land being converted to cropland because more biofuel production means higher demand for agricultural crops, which in turn means higher net return to cropland. In such situations, government intervention would be needed to prevent the loss of forest and grass land.
Our simple framework can assist the understanding of some of the most basic issues related to land use and biofuels. For example, upon careful examination, we show that the distinction between direct and indirect land use changes seems to be much less obvious than commonly assumed. Somewhat counter-intuitively, higher yields will not necessarily relieve the pressure on cropland expansion as many have argued or hoped. If anything, under free market conditions, higher yields for a crop that is used for biofuels will lead to even more land going into agricultural production. This is because higher yields mean higher profits on a given acre, unless output prices decrease dramatically. If biofuels account for only a small percentage of transportation fuel, as they do now, a greater supply of biofuels will not significantly depress fuel prices, which in turn implies that crop prices will not decrease significantly. However, higher yields can lead to a reduction in cropland area if government mandates act as a ceiling of allowed biofuels. The intuition is that wi t h h i g h e r y i e l d s , l e s s a r e a i s n e e d e d t o s u p p l y t h e wo r l d ' s n e e d for food and (a fixed quantity of) biofuels. 
 under these conditions. When ( ) 0 o c c dp p dp  , the proof is less obvious since the right-hand side of (15) is then the sum of two parts with opposite signs. Thus, we pursue the proof in an alternative way. Note that ; ; dp p dp p p dp . T h e s u p e r s c r i p t s " o l d " a n d " n e w" represent the situation before and after the rise in c p , respectively. Increased consumption can occur with decreased land share and input use only if total cropland area has increased, i.e., * ( ) 0 c c d p dp   .    is not obvious: the first term on the right is positive while the second is negative. However, note that given the same corn price, the decrease in the price of other crop means reduced land share and input use and increased consumption for other crop at market equilibrium. Given the same yield for other crop, this can only occur if the total cropland area has increased, i.e., * ( ) 0
Proof of
For i o  , the preceding argument related to C o n d i t i o n B ' a p p l i e s e x c e p t a t t h e l a s t s t e p :
due to yield improvement for other crop, reduced share and input use can occur together with increased consumption without increases in total cropland area. From ( 26) and ( 29) Proof of Proposition 5. If crop demand is perfectly elastic, then crop prices will not change at the new market equilibrium with higher yields. Total cropland area will adjust according to ( 29), which means that total cropland area expands at market equilibrium.
When crop demand is perfectly inelastic, then consumption of crops will stay the same at a different market equilibrium. Suppose total cropland area does not decline at the new market equilibrium with higher yields. We consider the two possible outcomes of land share and input use. First, land share and input use do not change. This, combined with higher yields and no decline in total cropland, means that the production of at least one crop is larger. Given that crop
